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NOTE AND COMMENT
INTERNATIONAL REcoGNITION AND THE NATIONAL COURTS.-In the lawv of
nations everything depends upon recognition. A newly organized state may
possess all the requisites of de facto existence, but it can gain admission to
the community of international law only as it is recognized by other states.
Even after it has been admitted to the international community it may be
virtually outlawed by the refusal of other states to recognize a change in its
government. It is through recognition and recognition alone that a de facto
state becomes and continues an international person and a subject of inter-
national law. See BONFILS, MANUEL, [5th ed.], sec. 199; OPPENHEIM, INT.
LAW, 2 ed., I, sec. 71; WHEATON, INT. LAW, [Lawrence's 2 ed.], p. 38.
Theoretically, perhaps, it may be said that as soon as a de facto state comes
into existence it enters ipso facto into the international community. See
HALL, INT. LAW, [7th ed.] secs. 2, 26; RIviER, PRINCiPES, I, 57; ULLMANN,
VOLKERRECEIT, sec. 30. But practically it is everywhere admitted that recog-
nition is a prerequisite to the normal and effective exercise of international
rights. Moreover, the granting or denial of recognition is within the dis-
cretion of each state. Theoretically, it may be urged that a new state or
government has a legal right to be recognized and consequently that there is a
legal duty of recognition. See BLUNTSCHLI, VOLKERRECHT, secs. 3, 35; HALL,
INT. LAW, [7th ed.], secs, 2, 26. But as a practical matter it is generally
conceded that there is nothing in the custom of nations which supports the
affirmation of such a duty. See BONPILS, MANUEL, [5th ed.], secs. 2oo, 2O1;
OPPENHEIM, INT. LAW, [2 ed.], I, 71. Cf. NYs, in RzvuS DE DROIT INTERN.,-
TIONAL, 2e., s&r., V, 294; PRADIER-FDERE, TRAITE, I, sec. 1114. "The decision
of each individual state, on the vital point of recognition, is thus not only
technically and formally, but in the majority of cases, really final. It cannot
be called in question even diplomatically, as may be done with the judgment
of a prize court; because, previous to recognition, there are no .diplomatic
relations between political communities. The judgment of the individual
state can thus be disputed only %4 et armis; and this judgment, be it re-
marked, extends not only to the facts, but to the law by which these facts
are to be measured. Each state is to say, not only whether or not a given
community fulfills the requirements of international existence, but is, more-
over, left to determine what these requirements are." LORIMER, INSTITUTES
o1 LAW ov NATIONS, I, 107.
The principle that international personality depends upon recognition
has important consequences in our national law. "International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of jus-
tice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquette Habana, (igoo)
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175 U. S. 677, 700. Sec. i7 MICH. L. Rtv.. i69. If the case turns upon the
existence of a foreign community, government, or state, the international
rule will be ascertained and applied by the courts only when the community,
government, or state in question has been recognized by the appropriate
department of our government. Thus, if the application of the rule depends
upon the insurgency of a foreign community, the rule will be applied only
if insurgency has been recognized. The Three Friends, (1897) II6 U. S. 1.
See also The Happy Couple, (i8o5) Stewart 65; The Manilta, (18o8) Edw.
Adm. I; The Pelican, (i8o9) Edw. Adm., App. D. Similarly, if the applica-
tion of the rule depends upon the belligerency of a foreign community, the
status of belligerency must have been recognized. See United States v.
Palmer, (1818) 3 Wh. 6io, 634; The Divina Pastora, (i8f9) 4 Wh. 52, 63;
The Neuva Anna, (1821) 6 Wh. 193. If the case turns upon the existence
of a foreign government recognition will be decisive. See Thompson v.
Powles, (1828) 2 Sim. 194, 212; Taylor v. Barclay, (1828) 2 Sim. 213; Re-
public of Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers, (888) L. R. 38 Ch. D. 348. For illus-
tration, injuries to citizens or subjects by acts done in a foreign country
became damnum absque injuria after recognition has conceded retroactively
that the acts were done in the exercise of governmental authority. Underhill
v. Hernandez, (1897) i68 U. S. 25o. And the seizure of property in a foreign
country cannot be questioned in the courts after recognition has conceded
retroactively that the seizure was done in the exercise of governmental
authority. Oetien v. Central Leather Co., (igi) 246 U. S. 297; Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., (i918) 246 U. S. 304. A foreign state may maintain
an action in the courts. The Sapphire, (1870) ii Wall. 164; United States of
America v. Wagner, (1867) L. R. 2 Ch. App. 582. But of course no action
can be maintained if the government of the state has not been recognized.
City of Berne v. Bank of England, (804) 9 Ves. 347; Dolder v. Bank of
England, (18o5) io Ves. 352. Eextensive immunities from jurisdiction are
accorded the agents and instrumentalities of a foreign state, such as the
immunity of a foreign sovereign, De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, (185i) 20
L. J. Q. B. 488; Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q. B. i49; the im-
munity of diplomatic representatives, Parkinson v. Potter, (885) L. R. 16
Q. B. 152; Macartney v. Garbutt, (89o) L. R. 24 Q. B. 368; Wilson v.
Blanco, (1889) 556 N. Y. 582; 17 MICH. L. Rv. 424; the immunity of public
agents in respect of acts done under the authority of their own state, Duke
of Brunswick v. King of Hanovor, (1848) 2 H. L. C. I; Hatch v. Baez, (1876)
7 Hun. 596;. Underhill v. Hernandez, supra; the immunity of ships of war,
The Constitution, (1879) 4 P. D. 39; Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
(1812) 7 Cr. 116; the immunity of other ships in the service of the state,
The Parliament Beige, (i88o) L. R. 5 P. D. 197; The Jassy, L. R. [igo6] P.
270; 17 MIcH. L. Rv. 425; and the immunity of property of the state, Vavas-
seur v. Krupp, (1878) L. R. 9 Ch. D. 351; Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of
Canada, (19o8) 197 Mass. 349. Recognition is of course a prerequisite to the
enjoyment of the above immunities. It is unnecessary to multiply illustra-
tions. The rules of international law will be administered by our courts in
a great variety of circumstances if the foreign community or state involved
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has been invested with international personality by the magic act of recog-
nition.
Since the act of recognition is essentially an act of discretion or policy
it belongs naturally to the political departments of government and par-
ticularly to the department in charge of foreign affairs. It belongs exclusively
to the political departments of government. "And if we undertook to inquire
whether she (Texas) had not in fact become an independent sovereign state
before she was recognized as such by the treaty-making power, we would
take upon ourselves the exercise of political authority, for which a judicial
tribunal is wholly unfit, and which the Constitution has conferred exclusively
upon another department." Kennett v. Chambers, (1852) 14 How. 38, so.
It is primarily an executive function. See P4NV=ID, in 32 Am. L. Rzv. 39o,
392. The decision -of the political department is conclusive for the courts.
"So soon as it is shewn that a de facto government of a foreign state has been
recognized by the government of this country, no further inquiry is permitted
in a Court of Justice here. The Court declines to investigate, and indeed
has no proper means of investigating, the title of actual government of a
foreign state which has been thus recognized." Republic of Peru v. Peruvian
Guano Co., (1887) L. R. 36 Ch. D. 489, 497. See also Emperor of Austria v.
Day, (i86i) 3 De G., F., & J. 217, 221, 233; Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894]
I Q. B. i49, 158, 16o, 161; Clark v. United States, (8ii) 5 Fed. Cas. 932;
Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., (1839) X3 Pet. 415, 42o; The Hornet,
(187o) 12 Fed. Cas. 529; Oetien, v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 302;
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 3o4, 3o8. The courts simply do not
take cognizance of an unrecognized state or government. See Thompson v.
Powles, supra; Taylor v. Barclay, supra; City of Berne v. Bank of England,
supra; Jones v. Garcia del Rio, (1823) Tur. & Rus. 297, 299; Rose v. Himely,
(18o8) 4 Cr. 241, 272; Gelston v. Hoyt, (1818) 3 Wh. 246, 324; United States
v. Palmer, supra; The Divina Pastora, supra; Kennett v. Chambers, supra:
PHILLIMORZ, COMMENTARIES UPON INT. LAW, [3 ed.], II, 37; PMDELIMVRE.
PaClS, I, sec. 122. If it becomes necessary for the court to know whether
or not an alleged community, government, or state has been recognized by
the political department, and there is no controlling proclamation, treaty, or
executive action of which the court may take judicial notice, the appropriate
method of ascertaining the fact is by direct communication with the political
department. There are a few dicta which suggest that it might be permissible
to prove the existence of an unrecognized community, government, or state
in certain circumstances. See Yrisarri v. Clement, (1826) 3 Bing. 432, 438;
Consul of Spain v. The Conception, (i81) 6 Fed. Cas. 359. And in the case
of The Charkieh, (1873) L. R. 4 A. & E. 59, the court entered into an ex-
haustive inquiry into the status of the Khedive of Egypt, although informed
by the Foreign Office that the Khedive had not been recognized. This method
was emphatically disapproved, however, in Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, supra,
and it may be taken for granted in England today that when in doubt the
court will always communicate with the political department and will treat
that department's reply as conclusive. See also Taylor v. Barclay, supra;
Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate, (igoo) 69 L. J. Ch. 375; The Gagara,
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(i919) 88 L. J. P. ioi; The Annette, (i919) 88 L. J. P. 107. It is thought
that a similar method would be followed in the United States. See Ex parte
Hits, (1884) 111 U. S. 766; In re Bai, (1889) i35 U. S. 403, 431; Underhill v.
Hernandes, supra; U. S. FoR. RIL., 1892, p. 644.
The complete subordination of the judiciary to the political departments
in the matter of international recognition is well illustrated by two recent
cases in the English Court of Admiralty. In the case of The Gagara, a Rus-
sian merchant ship was taken over by the Bolshevik Government under a
decree declaring the mercantile fleet national property, repaired and loaded
with a cargo of wood, and sent on a commerical voyage to Copenhagen. 
It
was seized and condemned by the Esthonian Government as prize of war. It
was then registered as belonging to the Esthonian Republic, placed in charge
of a master and crew appointed by the Provisional Government of Esthonia,
and directed to London, where it was arrested on behalf of the former 
Rus-
sian owners. In the case of The Annette and The Dora, Russian 
merchant
ships were requisitioned by the Provisional Government of Northern 
Russia,
with headquarters at Archangel, and were turned over to a Russian 
Co-
operative Association to be used in trading under the control of 
the Pro-
visional Government's Director of Naval Transports. The vessels 
were sent
with cargoes of tar to Liverpool, where they were arrested 
on behalf of
former Russian owners. In each case an appearance was entered under pro-
test and a motion made to set aside the writ on the ground that the vessel
was immune from arrest because it belonged to and was in the service of the
government of a friendly state. Tn each case the Court addressed an inquiry
to the Foreign Office in regard to the status of the provisional 
government
concerned. As regards Esthonia, it was replied that Great Britain 
had "for
the time being, provisionally and with all necessary reservations as 
to the
future, recognized the Esthonian National Council as a de facto independent
body," and accordingly had "received certain gentlemen as informal 
diplomatic
representatives of the Esthonian Provisional Government." It was also 
stated
on behalf of the Attorney General that "in the present view of His 
Majesty's
Government, and without in any way binding itself as to the 
future, the
Esthonian Government is such a Government as could, if it thought 
fit, set up
a Prize Court." As regards the Provisional Government at Archangel, 
the
Foreign Office replied in part as follows: "the Provisional Government 
of
Northern Russia is composed of Russian groups who do not recognize 
the
authority of the Russian Central Soviet Government established at Moscow.
The seat of the government is Archangel, and it extends its authority 
over
the territory surrounding that port, and to the west of the White 
Sea up to
the Finnish frontier. As the title assumed by that government 
indicates, it
is merely provisional in nature, and has not been formally recognized 
either
by His Majesty's Government or by the Allied Powers as 
the government
of a sovereign independent state. His Majesty's Government and the 
Allied
Powers are, however, at the present .moment co-operating with the 
Provis-
ional Government in the opposition which that government is making 
to the
forces of the Russian Soviet Government, who are engaged in aggressive
military operations against it, and are represented at Archangel by a 
British
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commissioner. The representative of the Provisional Government in London
is Monsieur Nabokoff, through whom His Majesty's Government conduct
communication with the Archangel Provisional Government." In the case
of The Garaga, it was held that the Esthonian National Council had been
recognized and that the writ should be set aside. Affirmed in the Court of
Appeal, (igig) 88 L. J. P. ior. In the case of The Annette and The Dora,
it was held that the Provisional Government at Archangel had not been
recognized, that in any event it was not in possession of the vesgels, and
accordingly that the writs should not be set aside. Admiralty, (i919) 88
L. J. P. io7.
It may well be regretted that in such a vital matter as international
recognition the courts are restricted to the trivial function of construing com-
munications solicited from the department in charge of foreign affairs. The
restriction can hardly be escaped, however, as governments are now con-
stituted. The courts themselves have indicated at least three reasons for this
conclusion: in the first place, the courts are not equipped to decide a question
of this nature, Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., supra; Kennett v.
Chambers, supra; PNFI4r1,D, in 32 Am. L. Rlv. 390, 406; secondly, sound policy
requires that the courts act in unison with the other departments of govern-
ment in matters involving foreign relations, Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate,
supra; The Hornet, supra; and thirdly, the conduct of foreign relations is
vested exclusively under the Constitution in Other departments of the gov-
ernment, United States v. Palnter, supra; Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co.,
supra; Kennett v. Chambers, mpra; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra.
It would seem, nevertheless, that international recognition ought on prin-
ciple to be determined in a proceeding of a judicial nature. International law
may properly define the elements essential to international personality; but
if the existence of these elements can be established, recognition ought to
follow as a matter of course. Moreover, it would be a great advantage if
recognition could be of general effect for all members of the international
community. The national courts are not available. Why not an international
jurisdiction? Why not make it possible for each community claiming recog-
nition to have its rights determined by a tribunal constituted at The Hague
from the panel of the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration? If a real
permanent court should be established under the League of Nations, why not
invest it with jurisdiction to hear and determine claims to recognition? The
suggestion may be regarded as somewhat utopian, but no more so, certainly,
than many another that has received serious consideration of late. Such a
reform, if it could be achieved, would be a great advance in the struggle to
rescue international law from the confusion and intrigue of diplomacy.
E. D. D.
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